Behind the Smiles: Leaked FSB Files Reveal China as Russia’s Hidden Enemy!
The partnership between Russia and China is often portrayed as an unassailable bond, a strategic alliance of two global powers united against Western dominance. Leaders Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping project an image of unwavering cooperation, with joint ventures in energy, trade, and even plans for a lunar base. Yet, behind this public facade, a leaked Russian intelligence document reveals a starkly different reality—one of deep suspicion and covert countermeasures. The F.S.B., Russia’s domestic security agency, views China not as a trusted ally but as a potential threat, accusing Beijing of aggressive espionage targeting Russian military secrets, territorial integrity, and strategic interests in regions like the Arctic and Central Asia.
The F.S.B.’s Secret Fears: China as “The Enemy”
Within the walls of the F.S.B.’s Lubyanka headquarters, a clandestine unit has sounded the alarm on China’s espionage activities. According to a leaked eight-page F.S.B. planning document, likely drafted in late 2023 or early 2024, Beijing is actively working to undermine Russian security. The document, obtained by the cybercrime group Ares Leaks and deemed authentic by six Western intelligence agencies, outlines a multifaceted Chinese espionage campaign. This includes efforts to recruit Russian officials, scientists, and journalists, steal advanced military technology, and gather intelligence on Russia’s operations in Ukraine. The F.S.B.’s concerns extend to China’s activities in the Arctic and Central Asia, where Beijing is accused of using academic and commercial fronts to advance its strategic goals.
The document’s timing is significant. Just days before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the F.S.B. launched a counterintelligence program codenamed “Entente-4,” aimed specifically at thwarting Chinese espionage. This initiative reflects Russia’s anxiety that Beijing might exploit Moscow’s preoccupation with Ukraine—a conflict that has drained Russia’s military and intelligence resources, with over 70% of its ground forces and intelligence assets redirected to the war, according to a 2024 CSIS report. The F.S.B. fears that China is capitalizing on this vulnerability to gain access to sensitive information and erode Russia’s strategic autonomy.
Espionage in the Shadows: China’s Targets in Russia
The F.S.B. document details China’s aggressive intelligence-gathering efforts. Beijing is reportedly targeting Russia’s military operations in Ukraine to study Western-supplied weapons and tactics, particularly drones and their software. With China’s military lacking recent combat experience—its last conflict was a brief war with Vietnam in 1979—Beijing sees Russia’s war as a real-world laboratory. The F.S.B. notes that Chinese defense firms and intelligence-linked institutes have flooded Russia since 2022, seeking data on drone warfare and Western countermeasures. A 2024 NATO report estimates that 80% of critical electronics in Russian drones are Chinese-made, highlighting Beijing’s dual role as both supplier and spy.
China’s focus extends to Russia’s scientific community. The F.S.B. claims Beijing is recruiting disaffected Russian scientists, particularly those in aviation fields like aerohydrodynamics and aeroelasticity. Specialists involved in the now-canceled Soviet-era ekranoplan project—a hovercraft-like warship—are prime targets due to their expertise and financial vulnerabilities. In 2023, Russia convicted 12 scientists for allegedly passing state secrets to foreign entities, with at least three cases linked to China, according to Russia’s Supreme Court data. The F.S.B. also accuses China of monitoring Russian citizens via the WeChat messaging app, using specialized software to hack phones and analyze data, a practice that mirrors Russia’s own surveillance tactics.
Territorial Anxieties: China’s Ambitions in Russia’s Far East
One of the F.S.B.’s most alarming concerns is China’s potential territorial ambitions along the 2,615-mile Russia-China border. Historical grievances over 19th-century treaties, which ceded territories like Vladivostok to Russia, fuel Russian paranoia. The F.S.B. document warns that Chinese academics are researching “ancient Chinese peoples” in Russia’s Far East, possibly to bolster claims to these lands. In 2023, China published a map renaming Russian cities with historical Chinese names, a move seen as provocative by Moscow. The F.S.B. has ordered operatives to restrict entry to foreigners involved in such “revanchist” activities and to monitor Russian citizens collaborating with Chinese researchers.
This fear is grounded in demographic and economic realities. Russia’s Far East, with a population of just 8 million across a vast region, is dwarfed by China’s northeastern provinces, home to over 100 million people. A 2023 Jamestown Foundation report notes that Chinese migrants are becoming the largest ethnic group in some Far Eastern regions, raising concerns about Beijing’s influence over local elites. Russia’s economic dependence on China—evidenced by China’s 30% share of Russia’s trade in 2024, up from 18% in 2021—further amplifies these worries, as Beijing’s investments could translate into political leverage.
The Arctic: A New Frontier for Sino-Russian Tensions
The Arctic, particularly the Northern Sea Route (NSR), is another flashpoint. The NSR, stretching along Russia’s northern coast, is increasingly viable due to climate change, with the Arctic expected to be ice-free by 2050, according to a 2023 Arctic Institute study. The route cuts shipping times between Asia and Europe by up to 5,000 miles compared to the Suez Canal, making it a strategic prize. China, branding itself a “near-Arctic state,” has invested heavily in the NSR through its Polar Silk Road initiative, part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2024, 98% of NSR cargo traffic involved Russia-China trade, with 1.5 million tons of crude oil and 17,000 tons of containerized cargo shipped, per the Center for High North Logistics.
However, the F.S.B. document reveals Russia’s unease with China’s growing presence. Beijing is accused of using mining companies and research institutions to conduct espionage, seeking data on Russia’s Arctic infrastructure. The Russian gas giant Novatek, for instance, turned to Chinese technology for its Arctic LNG 2 project after Western sanctions cut off U.S. suppliers in 2024. The F.S.B. fears that China’s investments—such as building docks in key Arctic ports like Murmansk and Arkhangelsk—are a Trojan horse for intelligence-gathering. A 2023 Risk Intelligence report notes that Russia’s reliance on Chinese systems for navigation and ice forecasting, due to sanctions limiting access to Western data, has further eroded Moscow’s control over the NSR.
Central Asia: China’s Soft Power Offensive
Central Asia, once firmly under Moscow’s influence during the Soviet era, is another arena of concern. The F.S.B. document highlights China’s “new strategy” to expand its soft power in the region, starting with Uzbekistan. While details are sparse, the strategy involves humanitarian exchanges, likely tied to China’s Belt and Road projects. In 2024, China invested $15 billion in Central Asian infrastructure, including rail and energy projects, surpassing Russia’s $10 billion, according to the Carnegie Endowment. Uzbekistan’s invitation to Russia for the Trans-Afghan Railway project in 2025 suggests a complex interplay, but the F.S.B. fears Beijing is eroding Russia’s historical dominance. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), co-led by Russia and China, saw a 25% increase in Chinese-led initiatives in 2024, signaling Beijing’s growing influence.
The Geopolitical Paradox: Cooperation Amid Suspicion
Despite these tensions, Russia’s economic survival hinges on China. Since the 2022 Ukraine invasion, China has become Russia’s largest oil customer, purchasing 2.2 million barrels per day in 2024, per the International Energy Agency. Chinese brands have filled the void left by Western companies, with Huawei and Xiaomi capturing 60% of Russia’s smartphone market by 2025. Joint projects, like the 2023 Sino-Russian Arctic shipping corridor, have slashed transit times, with 80 voyages delivering cargo to Chinese ports in 2024.
Yet, the F.S.B.’s directive to avoid public criticism of China underscores the delicate balance: Moscow needs Beijing’s support but fears its ambitions.
This paradox is reflected in Russia’s counterintelligence efforts. The F.S.B. has intensified surveillance of Russian citizens working with China, ordering in-person warnings about Beijing’s intentions. In 2024, Russia barred 5,000 individuals from entering the country, with 20% suspected of Chinese espionage ties, per F.S.B. data. Meanwhile, China conducts polygraphs on its agents returning from Russia and scrutinizes the 20,000 Russian students in China, according to the document, signaling mutual distrust.
Global Implications: Can the U.S. Exploit the Divide?
The F.S.B.’s suspicions offer a potential opening for the West, particularly the incoming Trump administration, which aims to “un-unite” Russia and China. A 2025 Foreign Policy analysis suggests that Russia’s reliance on China—coupled with its fears of espionage—could be leveraged to drive a wedge between the two. However, experts like Alexander Gabuev argue that Putin’s commitment to the partnership, despite known risks, limits this opportunity. The U.S. faces its own challenges in the Arctic, with only two icebreakers compared to Russia’s 40, per a 2023 U.S. Naval Institute report, hampering its ability to counter Sino-Russian cooperation.
The Russia-China partnership is a marriage of convenience, driven by mutual economic needs and shared opposition to the West. Yet, the F.S.B.’s secret document reveals a relationship riddled with mistrust. From espionage in Ukraine to territorial concerns in the Far East and strategic rivalries in the Arctic and Central Asia, Russia’s intelligence community sees China as a growing threat. As the global order shifts, with the NSR emerging as a critical trade route and Central Asia a geopolitical battleground, the tensions within this alliance could reshape international relations. For now, Russia treads carefully, balancing cooperation with vigilance, aware that its “no-limits” partner may have limits of its own.
